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Abstract
Over the last four decades, volcano observatories have adopted a number of different communication strategies for the dissem-
ination of information on changes in volcanic behaviour and potential hazards to a wide range of user groups. These commonly
include a standardised volcano alert level system (VALS), used in conjunction with other uni-valent communication techniques
(such as information statements, reports and maps) and multi-directional techniques (such as meetings and telephone calls). This
research, based on interviews and observation conducted 2007–2009 at the five US Geological Survey (USGS) volcano obser-
vatories, and including some of the key users of the VALS, argues for the importance of understanding how communicating
volcanic hazard information takes place as an everyday social practice, focusing on the challenges of working across the
boundaries between the scientific and decision-making communities. It is now widely accepted that the effective use, value
and deployment of information across science-policy interfaces of this kind depend on three criteria: the scientific credibility of
the information, its relevance to the needs of stakeholders and the legitimacy of both the information and the processes that
produced it. Translation and two-way communication are required to ensure that all involved understand what information is
credible and relevant. Findings indicate that whilst VALS play a role in raising awareness of an unfolding situation, supplemen-
tary communication techniques are crucial in facilitating situational understanding of that situation, and the uncertainties inherent
to its scientific assessment, as well as in facilitating specific responses. In consequence, ‘best practice’ recommendations eschew
further standardisation, and focus on the in situ cultivation of dialogue between scientists and stakeholders as a means of ensuring
that information, and the processes through which it is produced are perceived to be legitimate by all involved.
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Introduction: communicating during volcanic
crises
Over 80 volcano observatories across the globe are tasked
with monitoring and communicating timely and useful
information about the behaviour of a volcano (WOVO
2017). This assessment and communication role is structured
around volcano early warning systems, constituting a range of
communication techniques developed by volcanologists and
policy makers to provide information to populations at risk
from volcanic hazards and to allow them to seek safety, both
locally and regionally (Peterson et al. 1993). Such information
is crucial to the work of decision-makers responsible for safety
(Mileti 1999), who need insight into when and where the
volcano may erupt; the magnitude, style and duration of the
eruption; likely hazards and expected location; and the effects
of volcanic hazards at the local, regional and global scale
(Mileti and Sorenson 1990). One of the key elements of a
volcano early warning system, and the most widely dissemi-
nated through the media, is a volcano alert level system
(VALS), which is summarily defined as a Bseries of levels that
correspond generally to increasing levels of volcanic activity^
(Gardner and Guffanti 2006, p. 2). Globally, scientists are
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typically responsible for determining and disseminating the
appropriate alert level, although some countries have differing
responsibilities within the actors involved (WOVO 2018).
Deploying VALS requires that the scientists involved consider
how best to impart the scientific uncertainty associated with
monitoring data to user groups, in sometimes emotive condi-
tions (Harris 2015; Leonard et al. 2008), whilst also
contending with the technological constraints of the monitor-
ing techniques available, budget limitations and political sen-
sitivities (Potter et al. 2017; Fearnley et al. 2018). VALS re-
search to date has focused almost entirely on improving the
credibility and consistency of information that comes from
scientists operating in a national context. Largely as a result,
VALS have been subject to increased standardisation at na-
tional and international levels with the explicit aim of improv-
ing information (Potter 2014; Fearnley et al. 2012).
It has been well established that VALS are designed to
provide a ‘bridge’ between the scientific data on risk gathered
through the monitoring process and the mitigation decisions
and actions involved in the practical management of and re-
sponse to the relevant hazards (Fearnley 2011; Gardner and
Guffanti 2006). There has been very little research to date,
however, concerned with the use of VALS to facilitate the
communication of the scientific assessment of risk to those
required to make practical management and response deci-
sions. Recent exceptions have focused on the issues that arise
around the distribution of tasks and decision-making respon-
sibilities between the volcano scientists responsible for decid-
ing alert levels, and the decision-makers who rely on the alert
levels when making decisions during volcanic crises that have
significant social consequences (e.g. Andreastuti et al. 2017;
Hill et al. 2017; Newhall and Solidum 2017; Potter et al.
2017). Fearnley (2013) established that in practice, the high
levels of both scientific uncertainty and risk so characteristic
of volcanic activity have required that scientists consult local-
ly and take social and political factors into account when de-
ciding alert levels. Fearnley concludes that more transparently
deliberative approaches that bring scientists and decision-
makers together to agree on alert levels would have the poten-
tial to legitimise a greater level of coproduction of knowledge,
and increase shared understanding of the uncertainties and
risks involved on all sides. More recently, Papale (2017) ap-
pears to take issue with this suggestion. Citing the Bprinciple
of separation of roles^, he proposes instead that Bscientists
should base their evaluations exclusively on scientific knowl-
edge, providing decision-makers with clear, unambiguous in-
formation that they can use to fulfil their societal and political
mandates^ (Papale 2017, p. 4). He maintains that this infor-
mation should consist of probabilistic forecasts, which he
finds to be Bin a form most suited to provide decision-
makers with the realistic picture for their subsequent
decisions^ (Papale 2017, p. 4). Papale concludes that VALS
should be replaced by a Brational approach, in which varied
expertise is harnessed in a coordinated effort, uncertainties are
fully recognised and quantified, communications are unam-
biguous, and responsibilities reflect the social role and societal
mandate of all groups involved^ (Papale 2017, p. 4).
The coordinated effort that Papale invokes here has been the
goal of a wide range of science/policy collaborations over the last
three decades. But a large body of research in sociological and
science and technology studies has found that systemic factors
make it difficult to achieve coordinated efforts in which uncer-
tainties are recognised and quantified, communications are un-
ambiguous, and responsibilities are clearly socially mandated
(Beck 1992; Funtowicz and Ravetz 1994; Nowotny 2015;
Nowotny 2005; Pielke 2007; Stirling 2007). The problems stem
from the way that science communication actually works on an
everyday basis (Douglas and Wildavsky 1983; Jasanoff 2004;
Wynne 1996; Shackley and Wynne 1996). Scientific credibility
criteria are an effect of how meaning has been created, dissem-
inated and recreated (Gieryn 1999). As early as 1980, Hall
(1980) established that it is not enough to focus narrowly on
decision-making per se; it is equally important to understand
frameworks of knowledge, relations of productions and technical
infrastructure involved in both the provision and reception of
information. Two decades later, Cash et al. pointed out a large
body of work that had:
identified the importance to effective science advising of
‘boundary work’ carried out at the interface between
communities of experts and communities of decision
makers. This work highlights the prevalence of different
norms and expectations in the two communities regard-
ing such crucial concepts as what constitutes reliable
evidence, convincing argument, procedural fairness,
and appropriate characterisation of uncertainty. It points
out the difficulty in effective communication between
the communities that results from these differences,
and stresses the importance for effective advising of
explicit development of boundary-spanning institutions
or procedures (Cash et al. 2003, p. 8086).
Cash et al. (2003) drew from more than 30 case studies to
confirm that the use of institutions or procedures that span this
interface between scientific and decision-making communities
have been necessary to establish the usability and potential influ-
ence of scientific knowledge. The effective use, value and de-
ployment of information across this interface depend on three
interlinked criteria: the scientific credibility of the information,
its relevance to the needs of stakeholders and the legitimacy of
both information and the processes that produced it. Translation
of scientific concepts and terminology into accessible everyday
language is required to ensure that everyone involved under-
stands why and how information is scientifically credible (Cash
et al. 2003). Multi-valent communication among all involved is
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required to ensure that all involved, including scientific commu-
nities, fully understand relevance to stakeholder needs. The legit-
imacy of the information relies on the perception that the interests
and influences of all those involved, including both scientific and
end user groups, are included and balanced; legitimacy relies on
transparency, and is enhanced by mediation arrangements.
The research that Cash et al. (2003) built on had already
established that coordinated efforts of the kind invoked by
Papale (2017) necessarily occur at the hybrid, dynamic inter-
face between scientific and other communities, where the stra-
tegic demarcation of scientific and other tasks involves inev-
itable crossover (Guston 2001; Jasanoff 2011a, b; Parker and
Crona 2012; Drimie and Quinlan 2011). In this article, we start
from this understanding; it is not possible to restrict scientists
to science when they are communicating scientific informa-
tion across the boundary that divides science and non-science
knowledge domains, and neither is it best practice.
Cash et al.’s (2003) framework has been influential in a
range of topic areas concerned with large, complex issues.
First gaining traction in environmental management (Cash
et al. 2003; Sternlieb et al. 2013; Pesch et al. 2012; Parker
and Crona 2012; Crona and Hubacek 2010; Van den Hove
2007), this framework is now widely used in biodiversity
debates (Koetz et al. 2008, 2012; Perrings et al. 2011; Sarkki
et al. 2013), and in sustainable development (Hotes and
Opgenoorth 2014; Runhaar and van Nieuwaal 2010), climate
change (Lee et al. 2014; Hoppe et al. 2013; Friman and
Strandberg 2014; Iyalomhe et al. 2013) and public health
fields (Drimie and Quinlan 2011; Casale et al. 2009; Creech
and Willard 2001). There have been few explicit applications
of Cash et al. (2003) in the disaster risk reduction context.
Recent exceptions have focused on the use of boundary span-
ning institutions and procedures for disaster risk management
across scales (Djalante 2012), to coordinate national research
funding (Beaven et al. 2017) and research support for disaster
response and recovery agencies (Beaven et al. 2016), and to
implement tsunami early warning systems in the Indian Ocean
region (Thomalla and Larsen 2010).
In this article, we draw from this larger body of work, using
Cash et al.’s (2003) framework to analyse the way that VALS
has worked as a communication device. The aim is to build on
the work of Fearnley (2013) with a further clarification of the
value and limitations offered by VALS as a boundary span-
ning initiative, to demonstrate the utility of this framework in
the volcano alert context and to offer recommendations
concerning ‘best practice’ deployment.
An evolution of volcano alert level systems
globally
VALS (also referred to as status levels, condition levels or colour
codes) are used globally to provide volcanic warnings and
emergency information in relation to volcanic unrest and eruptive
activity based on data analysis or forecasts. VALS can be thought
of as a ‘black box’. In this concept developed by Bruno Latour
(1987), although both inputs and outputs are known, the inner
workings remain hidden, in that they become so widely accepted
by both the scientific community and society that they are no
longer open for debate. According to Latour, this is Bthe way
scientific and technical work is made invisible by its own suc-
cess. When a machine runs efficiently, when a matter of fact is
settled, one need focus only on its inputs and outputs and not on
its internal complexity. Thus, paradoxically, themore science and
technology succeed, themore opaque and obscure they become^
(Latour 1999, p. 304). VALS appear to be simple (one reason
they are so easy to black box) and so tend to be treated as such.
As Thomalla and Larsen (2010) note, however, the implementa-
tion of warning systems Bconsists of a wide range of social and
organisational processes^ and rely on Bchaotic patchworks of
communication that require multiple iterative coordinative ac-
tions between agencies, officials and citizens^ (p. 252). To un-
derstand the challenges faced by those implementing VALS, it is
necessary to open the black box and examine the social and
organisational processes that it obscures. This, in turn, requires
an understanding of the way that VALS have come about.
VALS have evolved over the last 40 years in response to a
series of crises that have triggered scientists and civil protec-
tion to devise systems to convey states of volcanic unrest. To
date, no complete history of the evolution of VALS globally
has been compiled. In addition, there is no catalogue of VALS
globally, nor any authoritative source of alert levels that is
official and endorsed. The current VALSWorking Group1 that
sits within the World Organisation of Volcano Observatories
(WOVO) Commission is working towards these goals, and to
provide a more informed understanding of VALS to help vol-
cano observatories make more informed decisions about the
design, implementation and integration of their VALS.
Fearnley et al. (2017) provide a broader overview of the evo-
lution of thinking around volcanic crisis communication over
the last century, bringing together studies on relevant case
studies, which include a focus on early warning systems that
provide a vital context to the development of VALS.
The development of VALS began in the 1980s, in response to
the Mt. St. Helens eruption (USA) in particular. Between
June 1980 and October 1986, this volcano continued to erupt
in the form of a dome-building phase punctuated frequently by
dome explosions (Swanson and Holcomb 1990). This cyclic
activity allowed the newly formed Cascades Volcano
Observatory (CVO) to develop accurate warnings as far as
3 weeks in advance for 19 of 21 explosions (Bailey and USGS
1983). Increasing confidence formany scientists in their ability to
provide precise predictions, this high rate of accuracy provided
1 Information on the VALS Working Group can be found here: https://vhub.
org/groups/volcanicalertlevelworkinggroup
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the impetus to develop a VALS for use at CVO. In 1985, the
United Nations Disaster Relief Organisation (UNDRO) pub-
lished a report on ‘Volcanic EmergencyManagement’. It features
one of the first examples of a VALS, called Bstages of alert of
volcanic eruption^ (UNDRO1985, p. 54). Each progressive alert
level reflects increasing indicators that the volcano is about to
erupt and provides an approximate period and a recommended
disaster manager response. From this point on, VALS have all
followed this linear progression whereby alerts rise with per-
ceived increasing levels of danger. The UNDRO report also of-
fers strong guidance in relation to using public announcements
that have been decided prior to any emergency to limit panic in
volcanic crises, emphasising the need for the public to be made
aware of the arrangements for receiving information. These de-
tails vary in each place, region and country, according to the
different Bpolitical and social structure of the community and
the technical means available. It is therefore difficult to lay down
any detailed guidelines for public information and warning^
(UNDRO 1985, p. 55). The report also highlighted the impor-
tance of local context and the need to develop an idealised VALS
for countries to adopt or adapt if they required. Possibly, because
of the importance of local contingencies, literature on VALS
since 1985 has remained limited until the 2000s, with some grey
literature written by various volcano observatories, institutions
and individuals.
By the late 1980s,VALSwere beingusedbyobservatories in a
number of countries, when a new type of VALS was devised to
communicate to the airline industry. During the eruption of
Redoubt onDecember 15, 1989, a Boeing 747 aircraft lost power
inall fourengines.Forced toglide, ithad lost4kminaltitudewhen
it restarted the engines only 1 km above nearby mountain peaks
(Brantley 1990). In response to this event, the Alaska Volcano
Observatory (AVO) was developed, and began using its aviation
colour code system in February 1990 during the ongoing Mt.
Redoubt eruption. Unlike the VALS that preceded it, this code
needed to specifically communicate ash hazards. The AVO
Scientist in Charge (SIC) and head of the US Geological Survey
(USGS)VolcanoHazardProgram(VHP)cameupwiththeidea,as
recordedduring email correspondence from theAVOSIC in1990
(FOIA2 archives) to senior VHP scientists atMenlo Park:
[We] desperately needed a simple device to communi-
cate to the airline industry the activity, or anticipated
activity of Redoubt volcano. I sprung it on the large
AVO group (maybe as many as 30 people mostly from
CVO,Menlo Park, etc.) at the next morning’s staff meet-
ing in Anchorage. Given the fact that we had geologists,
seismologists, lahar specialists, tephra people etc., the
proposed warning scheme almost immediately
ballooned to a 6 x 6 matrix (!) so as to satisfy everyone.
After the meeting was over, we went back to the original
4-colour scheme.
The success of the AVO Aviation Colour Code following
the 1996 Pavlof eruption (Roach et al. 2001) and 1989 Mt.
Redoubt eruption (Casadevall 1994) led to its adoption in
2005 by the International Civil Aviation Organisation
(ICAO). It is now an internationally recognised, used and
increasingly enforced VALS.
During the 1990s, several significant eruptions occurred
enabling the opportunity to design and implement specifically
designed VALS including at Mt. Pinatubo, Philippines in
1991 (Newhall and Solidum 2017; Newhal l and
Punongbayan 1996); Rabaul, Papua New Guinea in 1994
(McKee et al. 2017); and Soufriere Hills, Montserrat from
1995 to present (Aspinall et al. 2002). This resulted in numer-
ous VALS designed around specific volcanoes. These crises,
among others, led to a focused discussion around the manage-
ment of volcanic crises, the role of various warning systems
and of the scientists involved, resulting in the publication
‘Professional conduct of scientists during volcanic crises’ em-
anating from the 1999 IAVCEI Subcommittee for Crisis
Protocols (Newhall 1999).
Since the turn of the century, increasing standardisation
across national VALS has occurred, facilitating national adap-
tations to better fit volcanism type and national emergency
management protocols. The growing number of nationally
adopted VALS is illustrated, for example, by the 2006
standardisation of USGS VALS, in which three different
VALS were replaced by the standard VALS now used at all
five volcano observatories (Fearnley 2011). Similarly, until
recently, New Zealand operated two systems: one designed
for the hazards expected at frequently active cone volcanoes
and another for reawakening volcanoes. Both were based on
numbered levels (from 0 to 5) (GNS 2010). In 2014, however,
these were revised into a single VALS for ground-based haz-
ards (Potter et al. 2017). Many observatories continue to deal
with more than one VALS during a crisis. Both the US and
New Zealand alert levels are decided by the current activity of
a volcano; they do not provide action or advice to users for
mitigative action. In contrast, the Japanese VALS states the
measures to be taken by specifying areas of danger, indicating
the extent of evacuation and outlining expected volcanic ac-
tivity (Japan Meteorological Agency 2010). In Indonesia, the
Center for Volcanology and Geological Hazard Mitigation
(CVGHM) uses VALS to outline the potential impact of the
volcanic behaviour on surrounding communities, integrate ca-
pacity building in communities and assist in the implementa-
tion of actions during volcanic eruptions according to alert
level (Andreastuti et al. 2017). Montserrat Volcano
2 FOIA stands for The Freedom of Information Act in the USA where any
person has the right to request access to federal agency records or information
except to the extent the records are protected from disclosure by any of nine
exemptions contained in the law or by one of three special law enforcement
record exclusions.
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Observatory has designed an VALS whereby certain designat-
ed zones on the island are assigned an alert level that deter-
mines access restrictions to those zones. These examples dem-
onstrate the diversity in the style, design and use of VALS to
cater for the particularly requirements of each observatory; in
the case of Monserrat, the need to make sure people move to
safe zones or avoid dangerous ones (Donovan and
Oppenheimer 2015; Donovan et al. 2012). VALS used in de-
veloping countries are more likely to provide advice on miti-
gative action or evacuations to civil authorities and emergency
managers. The many factors involved in designing a VALS
include what information is provided, whether actions are rec-
ommended, the style of warning (actual or forecast) and the
number of VALS used. Different countries may also offer
differing capacities for decision-making in response to volca-
nic activity, moving from an extreme end-member where the
alert level de facto establishes actions, through to the public
authorities making the decision in isolation from the scientists.
WOVO states that despite often worldwide interest in the
status of any given volcano, Bwith the exception of colour
codes for aviation, currently there is no standardised interna-
tional volcano alert levels system^ (2018). This is due to the
Bwide variation in the behaviour of individual volcanoes and
in monitoring capabilities, and different needs of populations,
including different languages and symbolism of colours or
alert levels^ (2018). The WOVO recognises the importance
of local contingency, but also the fact that the aviation sector
requires a standardised tool they can understand regardless of
which airspace they are flying through.
Despite these variances, the possibility of developing a
globally standardised VALS for ground hazards has been con-
sidered. After exploring this possibility at volcano confer-
ences in the late 1990s and early 2000s, Scott (2007) conclud-
ed that there cannot be international uniformity in VALS due
to the wide range in volcanic eruptions and hazards, and the
recurrence of activity that requires a wide variety of needs to
be catered for. Scott questioned the standardisation process,
asking if it actually Bundermines the important function they
achieve^ (Scott 2007, p. 90).
Although VALS provides essential volcanic information to
decision-makers, only a handful of journal publications spe-
cifically review the implementation of VALS, discussing the
way they are operated and analysing strengths and
weaknesses. In the first of these key studies, Metzger et al.
(1999) reviews the impact a ‘yellow alert’ issued in Quito,
Ecuador, for the Guagua Pichincha volcano during unrest in
1998. They demonstrate that VALS become complicated pre-
cisely because they include stages of alert whereby each alert
has an impact on vulnerable societies; because they are con-
stantly changing, VALS are difficult systems to understand.
The second study, by De la Cruz-Reyna and Tilling (2008)
focuses on the introduction of a ‘Volcano Traffic Light’ alert
system for Popocatépetl volcano in Mexico, which the USGS
assisted in designing and implementing. This VALS has seven
levels of alerts for emergency-management authorities, but
only three levels for the public (green-yellow-red). This paper
highlights the fact that there is a further disparity within na-
tional VALS, as some countries, such as Mexico, have differ-
ent VALS for the decision-makers and for the public. Both
papers highlight the need for VALS to be locally adapted
and demonstrate the difficulties of using a linear VALS when
volcanic crises can occur for long periods, causing warning
information requirements to change as seen in the Metzger
et al. study of Guagua Pichincha Metzger et al. (1999).
Following these two initial publications, Fearnley published
on the use, standardisation and role of VALS at the USGS
(Fearnley 2011; Fearnley et al. 2012; Fearnley 2013), and
there have been a number of publications on the use of
VALS in New Zealand (Potter et al. 2017; Leonard and
Potter 2015; Potter 2014; Potter et al. 2014). Winson et al.
(2014) published an analysis of the issuance of volcanic alert
levels during volcanic crises stating that between 1990 and
2013, 30% of volcano warnings issued worldwide prior to
the eruptions of VEI3 or larger accurately reflect the potential
‘hazard before eruption’. Their findings suggest that the issu-
ance of information prior to an eruption is a complex, multi-
faceted problem, and the evaluation of what constitutes ‘suc-
cess’ is itself a complicated question (they ask is 30% success-
ful)? Aspinall et al. (2006) reviewed the role of using hidden
multi-state Markov models with multi-parameter volcanic da-
ta to provide empirical evidence for alert level decision-sup-
port, thus using Baysian statistics to assign an alert level.
Some observatories also tie in monitoring thresholds and
criteria to determine their alert levels. Papers that focus on
more recent case studies include Kato and Yamasato (2013)
that discuss the 2011 eruptive activity of Shinmoedake
volcano and the challenges of not having clear precursory
activity to provide an alert. García et al. (2014) discus the
volcanic alert system (VAS) developed during the 2011–
2014 El Hierro (Canary Islands) volcanic process, focusing
on the monitoring network, the software tools for analysis of
the monitoring parameters, the VAL management and the as-
sessment of hazard, providing a useful system that could be
useful to others.
Finally, a study by Donovan et al. (2018) investigating risk
perception at Popocatépetl volcano in Mexico (this volume)
highlights important links between warnings and trust and the
perceived motivation of particular groups, perceived trust and
perceived knowledge. Following an online survey carried out
from 2012 to 2014, their findings indicate that volcanic
warnings and, more specifically, VALS are in fact effective,
with greater level of risk perception in the public during raised
alert levels as a result of higher activity, aiding to the
communication and understandings of risk. Donovan et al.
(2018) highlight the Bimportance of considering the social
impact of warnings^ (p?) whilst also emphasising that VALS
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act as a boundary object allowing Bthe translation of risk in-
formation into terms that people can understand^ (p.?) be-
tween science and society, serving different functions on each
side of that boundary. The key thing to note is that whilst the
perceived knowledge of the volcano was the most important
factor in explaining trust, VALS have considerable and com-
plicated social impact. Studies such as these illustrate that
there is still significant work to be done in exploring and
evaluating VALS.
In summary, VALS differ greatly between countries, with
some including only descriptions of the level of physical phe-
nomena (e.g. differing criteria of volcanic unrest and size of
eruption), whilst others include hazards, potential impacts and
risk mitigation actions (including evacuations). Some include
forecasting, whilst others do not. Designing new VALS and
evaluating or revising existing systems requires an under-
standing of these options. These processes benefit from being
able to draw upon the experiences of others in similar situa-
tions, and the related theory of risk (and crisis) communica-
tion. With increasing levels of technology and communica-
tions methods (such as social networking), it is imperative that
VALS used by volcano observatories around the world retain
their credibility and trust, and work to serve legal, political and
local community requirements. This requires further
investigation in understanding how uncertainties are
conveyed and represented within the VALS and how these
are perceived by key decision makers, as discussed by
Fearnley (2013) and Fearnley et al. (2017). It is also important
to note that the original intent of VALS may vary in different
countries and that intent is very different from the reality of the
task, resulting in VALS evolving in different ways over the
years, in part to deal with changing technologies, growing and
more complex societies and differing legal and institutional
remits and protocols.
Another key distinction that has developed as VALS have
been designed and implemented around the world concerns
two distinct institutional roles awarded to volcano observato-
ries. In many countries, volcano observatories are classified as
state or gederal services. This is the case for example in New
Zealand and the USA, where such observatories are part of
national research agencies required to provide a public inter-
face (GNS and USGS respectively), in Japan and Iceland,
where observatories are run from within National
Meteorological Agencies, and in Mexico, where volcano ob-
servatories are run from within the Centro Nacional de
Prevención de Desastres. These institutional arrangements
and associated legal remits predispose the relevant observato-
ries to interface with end users, since they are required to
provide and prioritise public functions (typically of civil pro-
tection). However, in other countries, volcano observatories
are situated within institutes with a predominantly scientific
focus. In Ecuador, Italy and France, for example, the Instituto
Geofisico, the INGVand Le Institut de Physique du Globe de
Paris (IPGP) (respectively) are positioned in the science do-
main, which requires a primary focus on producing quality
science. It is possible that institutional remits that require this
more exclusive focus on scientific goals may result in VALS
design and implementation less attuned to an interface func-
tion between scientific and end user communities. Papale’s
(2017) defence of a clear division between scientific and op-
erational functions, for example, could be interpreted in the
light of this distinction, since he is based in an institute that
focuses on producing scientific, rather than public service out-
comes. We raise this point to note that this article draws from
research conducted exclusively with USGS scientists and the
associated range of USGS VALS end-users. Since the USGS
is required to provide a public interface function, these re-
search participants are likely to see the role of the volcano
observatory framed in terms of direct utility serving society.
This distinction aside, all volcano observatories need to use
a range of communication strategies in addition to VALS to
share information about changes in volcanic behaviour and
potential hazards with stakeholders. These strategies are ex-
plored in ‘Observing the Volcano World: Volcanic Crisis
Communication’ (Fearnley 2018), which brings together
knowledge and first-hand experience from a wide range of
stakeholders to provide a platform for understanding how vol-
cano crises are managed in practice. Areas explored include (i)
the need to understand the multiple hazards involved in a
volcanic crisis, (ii) lessons learned from past crises and (iii)
the tools available for effective communication during a crisis.
The chapters in this publication address the idealised program
to reduce volcanic risk devised by Tilling (1989), by exploring
the divide between volcano scientists who are responsible for
providing the best possible scientific information and advice,
and those who have knowledge of other key factors (e.g.
socio-economic, cultural, political and mass media) and the
authority to make final decisions regarding mitigation mea-
sures. This divide has been exacerbated by the 2011–2015
L’Aquila court hearings, in which five scientists and two
emergency managers were tried for allegedly making poor
judgements on uncertainty that affected both their communi-
cations to the public and the risk management actions the
public took in response (Bretton et al. 2015; Alexander
2014; Aspinall 2011). All VALS have been designed—and
are required—to bridge this challenging divide.
Using VALS to communicate
across the science/policy boundary
VALS are complex to define, in part because differing nations
use their alert levels for differing purposes. In New Zealand,
VALS are focused on the phenomenon; in the USA, they are
focused on the hazard, whilst in Indonesia and Japan, VALS
are focused on the risk and response required. Irrespective of
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focus, however, the defining feature of VALS as a communi-
cation device is that each has to work across different disci-
plines, user and stakeholder groups, and a range of institu-
tions, each with their own protocols and policies. This means
that VALS functions as a ‘boundary object,’ inhabiting
‘intersecting social worlds’ and satisfying the ‘informational
requirements’ of each of these worlds (Star and Griesemer
1989, p. 393). As originally defined, this sociological concept
applies to scientific objects that
are both plastic enough to adapt to local needs and the
constraints of the several parties employing them, yet
robust enough to maintain a common identity across
sites. They have different meanings in different social
worlds but their structure is common enough to more
than one world to make them recognisable, a means of
translation (Star and Griesemer 1989, p. 393).
In addition to serving as a means of translation, and in this
way enhancing understanding of why information is (or is not)
scientifically credible, boundary objects (Cash et al. 2003)
& Are more likely to produce relevant, usable information
because they engage end-users early.
& Can increase scientific credibility by involving different
types of expertise.
& Can enhance legitimacy by providing transparent access
to the processes of information production to multiple
stakeholders.
Applying this concept to analyse the use of VALS offers to
clarify the role of underlying drivers in the way that volcanic
crisis communication has operated in practice both prior to
and during volcanic emergencies from 2007 to 2009. The
USGS VHP is used as a case study. Operating across five
observatories, which have been established to monitor and
research volcanic phenomena and risk that manifest a wide
range of behaviours in different parts of the world, this pro-
gram engages with a range of different cultures, communities
and user and stakeholder groups. Between 2007 and 2009, 93
semi-structured interviews3 were conducted with both obser-
vatory scientific personnel and relevant user groups associated
with the AVO, CVO, Hawaii Volcano Observatory (HVO),
Long Valley Volcano Observatory (LVO) (re-established in
2012 as the California Volcano Observatory CalVo), and
Yellowstone Volcano Observatory (YVO). In addition to sci-
entists employed in observatories, interview participants were
drawn from user groups including other federal agencies such
as US Emergency Managers (country and state levels), the
National Weather Service, US Forest and National Park man-
agers, the Federal Aviation Administration, Volcano Ash
Advisory Centre staff, local town managers and police and
also included local and national media (for a full list, see
Fearnley (2011, pp. 108–109)).
A qualitative multi-sited ethnographic study was adopted
to trace the development and use of communication tools
across and within multiple sites of activity (the volcano obser-
vatories and user groups) by following connections, associa-
tions and putative relations. The study examined Bmultiple
sites of observation and participation that cross-cut dichoto-
mies such as the ‘local’ and the ‘global’^ (Marcus 1995, p. 95)
to explore broader trends and uses of volcanic communication
tools. This methodology provided a framework to establish
and evaluate warning communications in volcanic observato-
ries by providing a Bway to engage with scientific and techni-
cal practice in complex allegiances that go beyond description
and critique^ (Hine 2007, p. 668). Interviews were used as an
ethnographic tool to gain insights into how each observatory
operated in the context of communicating volcanic hazards,
supported by ethnographic observations from site visits and
meetings, and documental analysis of the communication
products at the case study. The interviews focused on the
personal perspectives of scientists and users involved in the
design and implementation of the VALS as these related to
what interviewees considered the definition and purpose of
VALS, how meaning was created within the VALS, the role
and interactions of scientists and user groups using various
communication techniques and their assessment of the effec-
tiveness of various communication techniques.
It is useful to reiterate that this research, and the methodol-
ogy used, did not conceive of information as a set of fixed
meanings that are imparted and interpreted with various de-
grees of accuracy via the medium of tools that can ‘distort’ this
accuracy. Communication was viewed as a social practice,
where objects and events are invested with meanings that are
selectively deployed, and that can be articulated in various
ways depending on the medium. Whether textual, image-
based or embodied, the medium plays a profound role in the
way that meaning is constructed, insofar as the way in which
information is represented can facilitate its manifestation as an
uncomplicated ‘fact’, as in for example a basic warning sys-
tem, or as a complex, multi-dimensional narrative that per-
suades an audience as to its veracity, as in a newspaper report
or film. The manner in which a medium ‘works’ to convey
meaning has in turn profound implications for the way in
which information is garnered and made sense of by a wide
range of individuals who on the one hand have a unique per-
spective predicated on their personal experience to date, but
on the other have also been ‘schooled’ to read various me-
diums in particular ways. From this point of view, a narrow
focus on the accuracy (or not) of information misses the point
of how communication actually works on an everyday basis,
3 In the following account, data has been anonymised, but the observatory and
details of the job specifics are stated in quotes to provide necessary context.
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insofar as such criteria are themselves an effect of how mean-
ing has been created, disseminated and recreated.
Constructions and interpretations can be more robust than
others to the extent that they more usefully convey the variety
of factors at work in a situation or event, such as the unfolding
of a volcanic hazard, and can form the basis for a more effec-
tive response to this. It is on these terms, however—specifi-
cally, the use value of information and its successful deploy-
ment—that an evaluation of a warning system must be based.
Standardised VALS and supplementary
information in the USGS
The USGS supports five volcano observatories, as outlined
above and has evolved a number of nationally standardised
communication systems such as the VALS, and tools that
communicate specific information to different user groups.
Star and Griesemer (1989) link the development and mainte-
nance of boundary objects to method standardisation, noting
that these are the two key processes involved in effectively
Bdeveloping and maintaining scientific coherence across
intersecting social worlds^ (Star and Griesemer 1989, p.
393). A number of features make standardisation attractive.
First, it improves the ‘doability’ of work. Fujimura argues that
doability enables scientists to Bconstrain work practices and
define, describe, and contain representations of nature and
reality^ and enables a Bdynamic interface to translate interest
between social worlds^ (Fujimura 1987, p. 205). Second, it
enables simpler procedures for people to learn from and carry
out. Third, in a number of spheres, particularly medical and
ethical, it provides answers to public concerns relating to pro-
cesses or procedures (Hogel 1995). Fourth, standardisation
provides political ordering and control. In summary,
standardisation offers a tool to communicate in compatible
ways (via language or protocols), ensure minimum quality
and provide a reference point (David and Greenstein 1990).
In 2006, the USGS adopted two standardised VALS (one for
ground-based hazards and the other for aviation ash hazards)
replacing pre-existing VALS that were locally developed at
each volcano observatory (Gardner and Guffanti 2006) (see
Figs. 1 and 2). The Aviation Colour Code developed by AVO
was adopted as the international warning system for volcanic
ash by the ICAO in 2006, and subsequently is the first globally
standardised VALS in the world.
The USGS established four key ‘standard’ requirements for
VALS, which were to B(1) accommodate various sizes, styles,
and duration of volcanic activity; (2) work equally well during
escalating and de-escalating activity; (3) be equally useful to
both those on the ground and those aviation; and (4) retain and
improve effective existing alert notification protocol^
(Gardner and Guffanti 2006, p. 1). Notably, three of these
requirements are directly concerned not with scientific
information as such but rather with function—the effective-
ness and usability of the VALS as a communication tool.
Ongoing standardisation processes were driven by a com-
bination of factors: internationally by the adoption of the
internationally used ICAO aviation colour code; national-
ly by the social context of the post-9/11 USA, which
shaped the broader emergency management policy; at
state level by the requirement to have consistent VALS
and alert level terminology to prevent confusion; and in-
ternally within the USGS, to provide a more consistent
and clear message. These standardisation processes are
discussed in more depth in Fearnley et al. (2012).
VALS, however, are not disseminated in a vacuum. As
Gardner and Guffanti (2006) put it, Bby themselves alert-
level terms and code colours do not convey enough informa-
tion for those in affected communities and aviation to make
decisions regarding specific courses of action^ (p. 4). Prior to
standardisation in 2006, the range of VALS created by indi-
vidual observatories were supported by a range of communi-
cation techniques, including telephone call-down lists, meet-
ings between the relevant actors, coordination plans, media
talking points and personal communication between the deci-
sion-makers. These can be described as either information
provision or knowledge sharing, depending on whether they
allow for two-way communication (Fig. 3).
After 2006, a number of knock-on changes were made to
retain and improve effective existing alert notification proto-
cols. Led by AVO (which is well resourced to review and
launch computer and web-based products), the VHP
attempted to develop a more geographically consistent com-
munication strategy by consolidating previous uni-valent
techniques into three categories (USGS 2017):
1. Event-driven (urgent) messages designed specifically
to fulfil users’ requirements, using a Volcano
Observatory Notice for Aviation (VONA) and a volca-
no alert notification (VAN) for ground hazard focused
users (see Fig. 4).
2. Time-driven (scheduled) status messages.
3. General information statements.
Additional information is provided to comply with the US
government Common Alerting Protocol (CAP) guidelines re-
quired by all emergency federal agencies and activities to
facilitate quick warnings (Oasis 2008). These messages are
available via a Volcano Notification Service (VNS), modelled
on the USGS Earthquake Notification System (Fig. 4).
Standardisation in this case is predicated on a more systematic
database with specific input fields. All the data is available on
the VHP website with alert levels assigned on a single map
using a specially designed code to represent both the volcano
alert level and colour code (see http://volcanoes.usgs.gov).
Flexibility is derived from the fact that different end
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products are geared to different users (aviation versus ground)
who have different requirements depending upon what
volcanic hazard affects them. There are also differing
timescales as to when messages are issued and messages
that are to specifically fulfil legal requirements.
During a crisis, each observatory follows a number of pro-
tocols, many of which are correlated to different alert levels.
Once the scientist in charge makes the decision to change alert
level or to issue new information (usually by consensus of the
observatory staff), the first requirement is to conduct a call-
down, that is, a sequenced set of quick telephone calls to key
agencies to notify them in person of the information, and
enabling discussion as to why the alert level has been issued
and what the specific data and interpretation is. Call-down
sequences are context specific, with each observatory using
a sequence that depends on relevant local factors (including
land owners, jurisdiction, the volcano’s activity and the spe-
cific hazard characteristics). Once the call-down is complete,
an electronic form of the information is emailed to all ad-
dresses on relevant observatory mailing lists. Both call-
downs and emails are multi-valent communication tools, pro-
viding opportunities for scientists and users to discuss the
information behind alert levels. By contrast, uni-valent com-
munication tools do not allow users to seek clarity and ask
specific questions of scientists in real time.
These opportunities are important, since there are numer-
ous hazards that can occur within close proximity of a volcano
that are excluded from the VALS, which relates only to the
occurrence of volcanic/eruptive unrest/activity. Some of these
hazards occur irrespective of volcanic activity, in different
locations and at different times. To address this issue, a num-
ber of the observatories have developed independent alert lev-
el systems for hazards that require warning systems specifi-
cally tailored to the nature of the hazard, such as volcanic
gases (in particular seen at HVO), lahars (CVO), volcanic
ash clouds, volcanic ashfall (AVO) and hydrothermal activity
(YVO) (see further information in Fearnley (2011)).
How VALS works in practice
Consistency is frequently identified as a key benefit of
standardised hazard and risk communications. A narrow focus
on consistency, however, fails to account for transactional and
GREEN  Volcano is in typical background, non-eruptive state 
or, after a change from a higher level, 
volcanic activity has ceased and volcano has returned to non-eruptive background 
state. 
YELLOW  Volcano is exhibiting signs of elevated unrest above known background level  
or, after a change from a higher level, 
volcanic activity has decreased significantly but continues to be closely monitored 
for possible renewed increase 
ORANGE  Volcano is exhibiting heightened or escalating unrest with increased potential of 
eruption, timeframe uncertain 
 OR  
eruption is underway with no or minor volcanic-ash emissions [ash-plume height 
specified, if possible
RED  Eruption is imminent with significant emission of volcanic ash into the 
atmosphere likely 
OR  
eruption is underway or suspected with significant emission of volcanic ash into 
the atmosphere [ash-plume height specified, if possible]. 
Fig. 2 Aviation Colour Codes
(Gardner and Guffanti 2006, p. 3)
NORMAL Volcano is in typical background, non-eruptive state 
or, after a change from a higher level,
volcanic activity has ceased and volcano has returned to non-eruptive 
background state. 
ADVISORY Volcano is exhibiting signs of elevated unrest above known background 
level  
or, after a change from a higher level,
volcanic activity has decreased significantly but continues to be closely 
monitored for possible renewed increase. 
WATCH  Volcano is exhibiting heightened or escalating unrest with increased 
potential of eruption, timeframe uncertain, 
OR 
eruption is underway but poses limited hazards.  
WARNING Hazardous eruption is imminent, underway, or suspected.
Fig. 1 Volcano alert levels
(Gardner and Guffanti 2006, p. 2)
Bull Volcanol  (2018) 80:46 Page 9 of 18  46 
other factors contributing to the effective use of VALS in
practice. VALS works well in operation, with all observatories
using it to relay the status of volcanic activity. These practices
rely heavily, however, on prior experience to familiarise all
involved with the meaning of different VALS alert levels.
Similarly, the limitations on the capacity of VALS to provide
useful and usable information are mitigated by the largely
multi-valent communication techniques and cross-boundary
networks that have developed between scientists and VALS
users. To appreciate and understand the workings of the
standardised VALS model, in other words, requires that it be
recognised as context dependent, relying heavily on everyday
practice. That is, the new standardised VALS ‘works’ precise-
ly because it continues to afford scientists the flexibility to
conduct their usual communication practices in order to trans-
late scientific information into a form that is accessible to
bureaucratic rationalities.
Scientists and users commonly regard VALS as a catalyst
that initiates the communication (both uni- and multi-valent)
required to facilitate required discussions and operational de-
cisions. As one scientist commented:
[An] alert level system is a shorthand, is the vehicle, it is
the excuse to get into communications and dialogue,
that gives you a justification and purpose […] that pro-
vides you the entry into having a discussion with very
busy people who are otherwise occupied with other
duties they have (VHP manager 4).
In practice, a VALS is a communication initiation tool, an
instrument to develop coordination plans and to provide gen-
eral awareness about the state of the volcano, rather than about
a specific hazard. If this communication occurs regularly, then
it may actually be surplus to requirements. That is, VALS can
appear overly complicated given that the concept is simply to
gain attention to an event and its anticipated impacts, and
valuable time can be spent on deciding alert levels that might
better be used to initiate the necessary communication to pro-
vide scientific information. It is through multi-valent commu-
nication outside of the VALS that producers and consumers
can establish meaningful interpretations of warnings, even if
they are based in different contexts.
Using Cash et al.’s (2003) model, we break down the var-
ious processes and issues that make the VALS and other com-
munication tools work in practice by classifying them under
(i) the need to ensure they are scientifically robust, driven by
the scientific credibility requirement; (ii) the need to generate
salient knowledge relevant to the needs of decision makers;
and (iii) to need to ensure that (i) and (ii) are balanced, in order
for both processes and information to be perceived as legiti-
mate. This classification is summarised in Fig. 5.
Fig. 3 Classifying
communication tools employed
between the USGS and other
users during volcanic crises
(adapted from Fearnley (2013, p.
1896))
AVO/USGS Volcanic Activity Notice
(VAN) 
(1) Volcano Observatory Notice For
Aviation (VONA) 
Volcano:  
Current Volcano Alert Level:  
Previous Volcano Alert Level:  
Current Aviation Colour Code:  
Previous Aviation Colour Code:
Issued:  
Source:  











(4) Current Colour Code: 
(5) Previous Colour Code: 
(6) Source: 
(7) Notice Number: 
(8) Volcano Location: 
(9) Area: 
(10) Summit Elevation: 
(11) Volcanic Activity Summary: 
(12) Volcanic cloud height: 
(13) Other volcanic cloud information: 
(14) Remarks: 
(15) Contacts: 
(16) Next Notice: 
Fig. 4 The framework for the newly devised VANs and VONAmessages
used in the USGS, following the standardisation of the VALS
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Credibility
To be successful, a VALS needs to meet scientific credibility
criteria. However, there are a number of challenges facing
scientists responsible for ensuring the accuracy of the warn-
ings they provide, many associated with negotiating the un-
certainty of the phenomena and of the monitoring data. In
order to provide timely volcanic hazard warnings to commu-
nicate to the users, it is important for the scientists monitoring
the volcano to accurately interpret scientific data, provide the
best information about current activity and if required, gener-
ate reasonable forecasts for potential hazards; this is addressed
fully in Fearnley (2013). Before scientists discuss what alert
level volcanic activity should be assigned, there is a rigorous
process of establishing exactly what is going on at the volca-
no. This process is often dependent upon the monitoring ca-
pabilities of each observatory to provide scientific data, the
technology and staff to interpret this data and the need to form
a consensus about what the volcano is doing. Whilst global
databases such as WOVOdat and GVM bring together global
expertise and comparative examples, each volcano has its own
‘personality’ (CVO senior scientist 7). Therefore, understand-
ing a volcano is ‘part science, partly an art’ (CVO senior
scientist 7), since volcanoes can behave in unexpected ways,
and recognising patterns of behaviour for a particular volcano
is critical to understand what that volcano is doing and to
generate accurate forecasts. The difficulties of establishing a
consensus concerning volcanic activity are further exacerbat-
ed by the often-short timeframes in which scientific evalua-
tions need to be conducted during a crisis and by the fact that
these evaluations often have a shared, rather than individual
value. Although procedural protocols can contribute to the
credibility of scientific evaluations, it is also important to rec-
ognise the subjective components in these evaluations.
Further complications arise when the scientists review
possible forecasts. Forecasts are highly relevant to users.
Forecasting volcanic behaviour involves much greater un-
certainty than simply determining volcanic activity, since
given volcanoes can sustain unrest or eruptions for long
durations. These uncertainties make assigning a volcano
alert level and deciding when to ramp-up or reduce the
levels a difficult, highly complex and concerning process,
with real-world consequences. Essentially, this ‘forces the
scientist to think about the alert levels rather than the
science’ (HVO senior scientist 5), driving a process in
which scientists rank the possibilities of what is likely to
happen and then release this information, rather than
conducting in-depth scientific discussions. We concur
POLICY DOMAIN HYBRID CROSS-OVER BOUNDARY DOMAIN:
BOUNDARY OBJECTS
SCIENCE DOMAIN 
Salience – is it relevant? Legitimacy – is it balanced, & transparently fair? Credibility - is it scientifically 
robust?  
Scientists








Advisory panels / boards 
Lone experts 
Key User Groups
Other Federal Agencies e.g.
o Weather Service
o National Forest Service












National policy and laws
Collaborative establishment of balanced:
Roles
Accountability
Co-production of Information 
Syn-Crisis 
SCIENCE TO POLICY COMMUNICATION (UNI-
VALENT)
Little opportunity for translation
Volcano Alert Level Systems (VALS) 
Information Statements 
VANS / VONAs 
Pre and Syn-Crisis
COMMUNICATION TOOLS (MULTI-VALENT)
Facilitate translation and co-production of knowledge 
Individual contact via phone / email / fax




Facilitate translation and co-production of knowledge 
Joint information centres (JICS)
Meetings and workshops
Media and press meetings








Concern for scientific 






Uncertain, complex  
Information 
Fig. 5 Mapping credibility, relevance and the generation of legitimacy to translate, communicate and mediate volcanic crisis information (adapted from
Beaven et al. (2017), Parker and Crona (2012) and Sarkki et al. (2013))
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with Papale’s (2017) concerns about the position this puts
scientists in. We differ from him, however, in that we
understand this position to be created by the use of a
linear process to try to manage a highly complex situa-
tion, and decision-making processes.
Relevance
For VALS to be effective, assessments conducted by scientists
must be relevant to the needs of the key decision makers. The
relevance requirement has been found to drive associated de-
mands for timeliness and for simple accessible alert informa-
tion (Sarkki et al. 2013; Parker and Crona 2012). With refer-
ence to VALS, this includes demand for timely simple and
accessible alert information, that is usable subject to a range
of contingent factors.
Timeliness
When providing warning information, the key issue for end-
users is to provide timely information. During times of non-crisis,
those involved can spend time deliberating plans and protocols.
During a crisis, information is required quickly, regardless of
scientific uncertainties, and with guidance on what the informa-
tion means and how to act upon it. Scientists can be reluctant to
disseminate guidance due to scientific uncertainty, since it is
often impossible to accurately predict what a volcano is going
to do until days/hours/minutes before it happens. In addition to
concerns about the credibility of the information, scientists are
also concerned about the legal context of such warnings.
Numerous users reported in interviews that volcano observato-
ries are discouraged from issuing alerts until there is greater cer-
tainty, because a VALS is a legal ‘formal warning’ under the
USGS mandate provided by the USA Stafford Act. This places
pressure on the scientists to get the decision ‘right’ before issuing
alerts (AVO scientist 3).
Users however are much more concerned with the rele-
vance of information. It was common for users to state that
it is better to communicate what is known to the users irre-
spective of how certain or clear scientists were about the situ-
ation. For users, it is much better to say something albeit
uncertain rather than ‘nothing at all’ (LVO scientist 2). A user
in the Cascades, for example, expressed frustration with the
time needed to debate and initiate a VALS and accompanying
information statement,
Basically, after the action in 2004, I said I thought that it
was dangerous actually; that they got state emergency
managers and people like ‘x’ just sitting around decid-
ing what the words [for the information statement] are
going to say, and I said ‘you know we need to call ‘y’,
and let them know. I don’t care what it [information
statement] says we just need to know that something
has changed’. To be sitting worrying about what the
three sentences are is silly. […] There is this tension
between wanting to have everything be just right and
needing to get the word out (CVO user—USFS).
Another lesson here is that informal methods of communi-
cation such as telephone calls were a valuable means of facil-
itating timely interaction and the translation of scientific un-
certainty one on one to end-users, since they did not techni-
cally involve issuing official warning information.
Establishing meaning in alert levels
The explicit aim of introducing standardised VALS, as noted
above, has been not only to ‘fix’ the meaning of the informa-
tion they convey but also to fix the meaning of a VALS itself.
Such efforts are complicated by the fact that each VALS is
understood in relation to prior learning experiences, that
‘school’ users to respond in particular embodied ways to the
medium provided. One such example, recalled at both AVO
and at HVO as illustrative of the role of prior experience,
concerned a commercial Alaskan pilot flying from Alaska to
Hawaii. The pilot, used to flying in Alaska and dealing with
the aviation colour code frequently in place there, was con-
cerned that the Kilauea volcano on the island of Hawaii was
assigned an orange alert level. Based on his experience of
warnings issued in Alaska, he anticipated that the volcano
would be exhibiting unrest with increased potential for erup-
tion with ash. When the pilot arrived in Hawaiian airspace, he
expected some form of diversion or information (such as a
Volcanic Ash Advisory) regarding Kilauea, but received noth-
ing and landed with no problems. He later discovered that
Kilauea was erupting, but emitting such a small ash plume
that low-level flying was only prohibited within close prox-
imity of the volcano.
Generating a meaningful warning or ensuring that informa-
tion that is used as intended is challenging for a number of
reasons. The ambiguity of alert levels is acknowledged. In
particular, the orange/watch alert level presents a problem,
because it involves two descriptions for the VALS, with one
predicting imminent eruption and the other describing an al-
ready occurring but non-threatening eruption. This is a specif-
ic issue demonstrating the importance of VALS design and
criteria. There is general concern that an alert level can gener-
ate complacency. If at a single status other than green/normal
for too long, the alert level loses meaning and impact, as seen
with the Homeland Security Terror Alert System which has
been historically disregarded due to perceived lack of efficacy,
often staying at one alert level for years rendering it meaning-
less (CVO user—emergency manager 2). For places like
Hawaii, constant eruption means alert levels remain at or-
ange/watch. For users, this can become the ‘status quo’,
 46 Page 12 of 18 Bull Volcanol  (2018) 80:46 
prompting them to think ‘I do not need to be worried about it’.
In the case of pilots, this kind of thinking can put the lives of
passengers in danger if the volcano suddenly erupts, as per the
orange/watch alert level (AVO user—FAA).
Legitimacy
Legitimacy relies on the perception that the processes through
which information has been generated and disseminated have
included and balanced the interests and knowledge of all in-
volved (Cash et al. 2003; Sarkki et al. 2013). This can be
difficult to do using VALS, since they are not a static tool
but rather change in purpose as the volcano ramps up and
down from an eruption, and during various phases of eruptive
activity. VALS have in effect been used to encompass at least
two roles, driven by demand from users, consisting of a fore-
casting tool with warnings and a reportage tool describing
what was happening at the volcano, such as an eruption, also
seen in Quito, Ecuador, in 1998 (Metzger et al. 1999). This
combination of roles can help to make a range of users
become more expert, increasing understanding of the his-
tory of the relevant volcano and awareness of what to
watch out for, so that once an alert level is issued they
know how to respond (AVO user—NWS 2).
The overriding consensus among all interviewees as to
what VALS are intended to accomplish was that VALS were
an awareness-raising medium, or ‘flag’, providing a Bheads
up, pay attention, something has changed, you need to look at
reports, updates for information statements, or listen to advice
from federal agencies^ as one interviewee put it (CVO Senior
Scientist 2). This applied across the interface between com-
munities of experts and of end-users. The VALS helped to
Bramp up situational awareness^ among users in that it
Bdictates and drives our situation awareness and staffing^
(AVO user—NWS 3), and provided an equivalent Bflag for
users for how often the users should be looking for
information^ (CVO scientist 12). Interviews suggested that
scientists similarly responded to VALS as an awareness rais-
ing mechanism, since the rate at which they Bprocess and
disseminate information is dependent on the alert level^
(CVO scientist 12), implying that at red alert, information
statements would be issued faster than at yellow alert.
Expectations on the role of the VALS
Defining a VALS is critical to establish whether or not it
serves its purpose and to determine whether stakeholders
share a common understanding of what the alert levels are.
The overriding consensus among the expert community was
that VALS were used to alert users, communities, and individ-
uals to the state of the volcano in a simple and concise mes-
sage that allowed them to gear an appropriate response (AVO
senior scientist 1/HVO scientist 1). Scientists regarded VALS
as a tool to translate scientific assessment information about
the nature of volcanic unrest and possible hazards quickly to
non-scientists, excluding technical details, so that the use of
one word, such as ‘Red’, would allow a large and diverse
range of people to know what the conditions are (HVO scien-
tist 2). At the same time, it was also widely accepted that an
alert level alone cannot provide all the information required
for users to make decisions:
[The] complicated reduction of all of these factors (risk,
hazard, activity) and boiling that down to a simple num-
ber [means] inevitably if you do that, something is going
to be lost. You can’t just project a ten-dimensional prob-
lem down to one dimension and expect it to retain all its
complexity (AVO scientist 4).
How an alert level is defined and what it means depends on
a balance between the meaning conveyed by the scientists and
that understood by the users, which relies on their institutional
requirements for the alert. Interviewswith users suggested that
they regarded the VALS as a scale to determine the importance
and relevance of the information being distributed. This is at
odds with the understanding of those issuing the VALS, who
regarded it as a concise indication of the science—which is to
say the eruptive activity of the volcano. Users tended to work
in busy government agencies that were often already
overwhelmed with other duties. This made establishing the
urgency of warning information a key priority, since they
needed to determine Bwhere we are in terms of imminent
danger^ (LVO user—Mammoth Lakes town 2). The VALS
helped to Bramp up situational awareness^ and Bdictates and
drives our situation awareness and staffing^ (AVO user—
NWS 3). Consequently, although VALS provided information
about the physical hazard, they were primarily useful and used
for planning purposes. Some senior scientists felt that VALS
were in effect a distraction from the need for more communi-
cation between scientists and non-scientists:
I think the whole alert level thing is […] an attempt to
better communicate with the public, media [and] help
scientists convey the message. Most people put too
much emphasis on that and not enough with the basic
problem, which is communication between scientists
and non-scientists (HVO senior scientists 4).
User groups tended to agree with this assessment, but from
the other direction. Those in charge of making decisions about
people’s safety had difficult problems to deal with like
Bshould I evacuate or not?^ (LVO user—emergency manager
1), Bwhere are people going to go/live?^ and Bwill people
actually pay attention or ignore the warnings?^ (HVO
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user—emergency manager). Using the VALS alone cannot
facilitate discussion of these real-world issues. Where scien-
tists focused on the need to translate scientific information to
users, emergency managers expressed the need for scientists
to develop a better understanding of the problems they face in
order to help with their decision-making processes, and limi-
tations in knowledge (Fearnley 2013).
The role of contingency
Every volcano has a diverse range of hazards in different
spatial and temporal combinations, making the individual be-
haviour of each unique. This can make understanding the
activity and issuing a warning for a volcano alert a highly
complex and context-specific process. Many hazards can oc-
cur within close proximity of a volcano, whether it is active or
not, in different locations (geographically), and at different
times. Most are excluded from the VALS, which relates only
to the occurrence of volcanic/eruptive unrest/activity, and
must apply to every volcano. Many scientists stated that
VALS should convey information about all volcanic hazards,
whether they proximal to the volcano, i.e. volcano-centric, or
distal. Some expressed the view that a warning can only be
truly issued after the event has begun (CVO collaborator 2),
which means that the only way to measure if a lahar has
developed, or where an ash cloud is moving, is to monitor
them individually. A number of the observatories have devel-
oped independent alert level systems tailored to the nature of a
range of these hazards, including volcanic gases (in particular
seen at HVO), lahars (CVO), volcanic ash clouds, volcanic
ashfall (AVO) and hydrothermal activity (YVO). The unique
individual behaviour of a volcano, each with differing hazards
in differing spatial and temporal relations makes monitoring,
understanding the activity and issuing a warning for a volcano
alert highly complex processes.
In addition, contingent institutional factors need consider-
ation as they are shaped by local cultural, political and judicial
systems. The dynamics of USGS policy, governance and op-
erations had a profound effect on the resources required to
provide an effective VALS, such as funding for monitoring
capabilities, staff resources and protocols for issuing warn-
ings. Education and outreach were essential activities to en-
sure that stakeholders are aware of VALS and how they work,
but these required significant staff time and resources. In ad-
dition, each user group will also have their specific institution-
al and legal remits, factors and limitations to consider.
Inevitably these factors, along with securitisation, influence
how communities will respond to a warning.
The diverse range of contingencies arising out of the insti-
tutional and geophysical context associated with any given
volcano further underlines the importance of including
VALS as one among a suite of boundary objects used to fa-
cilitate the co-production of knowledge and decision-making
about volcanic risk. To make sure that the decoding of a warn-
ing was accurate and meaningful, all the actors involved
worked very hard external to the VALS. This was done using
other boundary objects, including multi-valent communica-
tion products (via protocols) and collaboratively developed
coordination plans and meetings that gave user groups oppor-
tunities to discuss what the hazards and potential risks were,
and to prepare by co-producing response plans. This open,
multi-valent communication allowed mutual understandings
of events to emerge, helping to bring together knowledge
and expertise from both sides of the science and decision-
maker interface. It was this process that over time helped all
those involved (including the observatory scientists) to recog-
nise and understand each other’s needs and concerns, thereby
incorporating local context into the dialogue process. Such a
dialogue depended, however, on preparatory work in order to
make the communication network ‘work’.
These communication techniques function differently from
VALS. They fostered a sense of trust based on dialogue, for
example, rather than implying the top-down authority created
by the uni-valency of VALS. A number of users expressed the
view that trying to get Bfacts out of scientists^ was difficult,
but by Bbuilding trust ahead of time^, it was possible to trust
each other and understand each other’s limitations, despite
institutionally Bdifferent cultures^ (CVO scientist 5). This
was also the conclusion of Peterson (1988, p. 1467) who
pointed out after interviewing journalists and scientists fol-
lowing the 1980Mt. St. Helen eruptions that journalists found
that Bscientists are too long-winded; they talk all around the
subject and never get to the point; they do not understand that
we need to use straightforward, simple statements; we have to
convert the complicated discourses to words that people can
read^ (after Peterson 1988, p. 4167).
The development of coordination plans—as implemented
in Alaska, the Cascades, Mammoth Lakes and in Hawaii (Hill
et al. 2002, 2017; Madden et al. 2008)—was key to this pro-
cess. The plans were drawn up to provide background infor-
mation about the volcano, its history and potential hazards, the
different land owners, stakeholders and federal or state agen-
cies involved with the land, and the plan for a crisis. It is
through meetings, developing preparedness plans and
reconvening frequently that the actors get to know one another
and create the potential to rapidly generate Bsituational
awareness^ between scientists and users (CVO scientist 5).
This enabled scientists to communicate issues around un-
certainty, for example, so that Bthey [users] have some
sense of our level of anxiety on escalating unrest on a
volcano so they can understand the alert levels better^
(LVO senior scientist 1). Furthermore, coordination meet-
ings provided the opportunity to clarify the nuances of the
terms as understood by the users and scientists, so each
group was confident about what each alert level is likely
to mean to each user for that specific volcano.
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Conclusions and communications best
practice
Analysing VALS as boundary objects that are successful to
the extent that they satisfy the informational requirements of
both scientific and end-user communities clarifies both the
utility and limitations of VALS. To the extent that they are
provided as information about a scientific event (volcanic un-
rest), but received as an indication of relevance (the compar-
ative urgency of the information), VALS alerts do not translate
science into a form that is understood by and relevant to end-
users. Rather than constituting scientifically credible and rel-
evant information, the alerts change from scientifically credi-
ble information to a different, relevant message, as they pass
from scientist to decision-maker community. To be legitimate,
the information conveyed by VALS needs to remain both
scientifically credible and relevant on both sides of this inter-
face. This requires that VALS be deployed as part of much
wider discussion and consultation networks that bring scien-
tists and users together early to facilitate effective, relevant
hazard and risk decisions based on credible, widely under-
stood science that is relevant to decision-maker needs. To be
legitimate, VALS need to be perceived by all to include and
balance the needs, interests and perspectives of scientists and
decision-makers. This inclusion and balance was occurring
through the discussion and consultation networks through
which VALS were disseminated and enabled. But a stronger
focus on developing the decision-making and communication
processes that already occur outside of the current VALS so
that they are more accessible and transparent would enhance
the legitimacy of information further, by providing transparent
access to the processes of information production. This would
also make it possible to simplify VALS, reducing its limita-
tions and potentially improving effectiveness as one among a
number of boundary-spanning tools.
VALS are used globally and provide a general level of
awareness that volcanic unrest is occurring, despite inabilities
to be specific. The research presented here suggests that sim-
plifying a VALS to minimise limitations would be beneficial
for all stakeholders. GNS in New Zealand, for example, re-
cently redesigned their entire alert level system into six levels
based only on volcanic phenomenon and likely associated
hazards (Potter et al. 2017). Using only volcanic phenomenon
that ranges from small-scale unrest to caldera-sized eruptions,
this system has been designed to make the assignation of the
alert level easier and quicker by clearly defining simple de-
scriptive levels with no elements of forecasting, risk or multi-
ple meanings. Such a considered VALS has the potential to
minimise complications relating to the issuance and interpre-
tation of alerts, and it will be of interest to see this new VALS
operates following a number of crisis.
But are there alternatives? Given that the emphasis on scien-
tific certainty is hampering the capacity to issue timely warnings,
it may be time to adapt VALS to reflect the informational re-
quirement of users for timely relevant information. A system that
was devised to show how severe/urgent a warning is and how
much attention is needed by user groups would be much more
relevant to their informational requirements, and easier to issue
in a timely fashion. This is critical for uni-valent communication
tools such as information statements. Again, however, in order to
ensure that it was both relevant and scientifically credible, com-
munication tools would have to be developed through transpar-
ent communication and discussion networks that bring scientists
and end-users together so that all involved understand the pro-
cesses through which the alert information is developed. Or as
Peterson (1988) put it Bwemust draw deeply into our reserves of
creativity and ingenuity to find more effective ways to present
essential information, perhaps by improving our own presenta-
tion, perhaps by finding new allies to assist us^ (p. 4168). Such a
VAS (see Fig. 6) could serve a similar purpose to a VALS, but in
a more transparent way—based on science, and acting as a trig-
ger for discussion via the already existing communication struc-
tures so that users can make decisions based on timely informa-
tion (even if uncertain), and the scientists can focus on providing
this information and interpreting the scientific data. Colours are
deployed here as opposed to weather related terminology (see
more about alerts used in weather forecasts in Gill 2008), be-
cause users have been schooled to regard these as indicative of
various levels of urgency.
Whilst large volcanic eruptions gain the attention of the
media, many people who live around active volcanoes in the
USA are affected by hazards that persist over long periods,
such as noxious gases (e.g. Long Valley caldera), and low-
level seismicity (e.g. Long Valley, Yellowstone and Hawaii).
Such ever-present hazards are not captured in the VALS, de-
spite providing discomfort to local populations. A Volcano
Awareness System could help accommodate short to
medium-term changes and indicate the level of hazard/risk at
each volcano and the anticipated severity of a hazard such as a
lahar, ash or gas emissions to user groups. Removing both the
alert level descriptions and the focus on the eruptive activity
enables the system to express awareness about the different
hazards and situations in a simple design. This system could
potentially be standardised nationally, potentially internation-
ally, yet be locally operated and adapted for the local hazards
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Fig. 6 An example of what a Volcano Awareness System could look like
(Fearnley 2011, p. 256)
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It is important to again highlight that current knowledge
and research on VALS remains limited. It is not yet possible
to outline appropriate or inappropriate use of VALS or to
establish guidelines, in part because each VALS and institu-
tion using them is driven by their unique, and changing set of
contingencies. The VALS Working Group as part of WOVO
are working to gather vital information and empirical data on
VALS that is much needed to answer many outstanding issues
about the use and effectiveness of VALS.
The research and work presented in this paper makes it clear
that the capacity to identify issues and solutions during volcanic
crises relies on dialogue and collaboration between scientists and
those at risk. This is not to suggest that scientists be required to
make decisions on non-scientific issues; as Papale (2017) argues,
this would be inappropriate. Rather, it is to argue that such deci-
sions should be the result of deliberative processes. It is clear that
whilst VALS are still evolving, they do have a pivotal role in
creating the common ground to bridge the gap between the sci-
entific and the operational side of volcanic crisis management.
Bridging this gap is necessary to foster the interaction required to
manage volcanic crises. In terms of best practice, it is recom-
mended that rather than attempting to ‘police’ the divide between
hazard (observatory scientists) and risk (user groups), sustained
dialogue and trust building is key to ensuring that outcomes are
both scientifically credible and relevant, and so generating the
legitimacy required by all stakeholders involved in the manage-
ment of volcanic crises.
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